



National Strategic Risk Assessment 2026

Submission from the Event Industry
Association of Ireland (EIAI)

Public Consultation on the National Strategic
Risk Assessment 2026

October 2026

A submission on public-event and mass-gathering
risks within Ireland's national strategic risk framework



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Executive Summary

The Event Industry Association of Ireland (EIAI) welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the National Strategic Risk Assessment 2026. EIAI represents a broad cross-section of Ireland's professional event industry and brings an industry-wide perspective on how national policy, regulatory, emergency-management and operational systems interact in live event environments.

EIAI considers that the 24 strategic risks identified in the National Strategic Risk Assessment 2024 remain relevant and does not propose that any be removed. Many have direct implications for events, including extreme weather, infrastructure resilience, energy security, cybersecurity, public health, terrorism, transport disruption and social cohesion. Public events can bring several of these risks together within a single operational environment involving people, temporary infrastructure, public spaces, transport systems and multiple public and private organisations.

The central issue raised in this submission is whether public-event and mass-gathering risks are sufficiently visible within Ireland's wider strategic-risk framework, particularly where an event falls outside, or does not enter, established statutory planning and multi-agency processes. EIAI is not proposing that every event should be subjected to the Outdoor Event Licence process or that the existing 5,000-person threshold should simply be reduced. The concern is whether events whose characteristics warrant additional planning, specialist input or multi-agency coordination are consistently identified and brought within appropriate processes.

There is already significant State recognition of this issue. The National Risk Assessment for Ireland 2023 - Updated 2026 identifies Large Crowd Event as a Civil Risk and uses, as its reasonable worst-case scenario, an unlicensed gathering organised without consultation with the Principal Response Agencies and without a comprehensive emergency plan. In 2021, the Night-Time Economy Taskforce recommended a standardised event-planning system across local authorities for events of 5,000 people and under, while HSE emergency-planning material identifies the need for guidance when dealing with unlicensed events. Taken together, these sources indicate a recurring concern around events that fall outside established planning and consultation arrangements.

The strategic vulnerability is therefore one of visibility, information flow and coordination rather than the existence of multiple administrative pathways. Different types of events will legitimately be managed through different statutory and administrative processes. The concern arises where an event capable of generating material public-safety consequences can move through the wider system without its actual risk profile triggering a proportionate level of scrutiny or coordination.

EIAI supports a proportionate, risk-based approach. Straightforward, low-risk activity should be able to proceed efficiently, while event characteristics such as crowd profile, location, temporary infrastructure, transport impacts, emergency access, medical provision, adverse-weather exposure, security considerations and delivery complexity should inform the level of planning required. The objective is not additional regulation for its own sake, but a system in which planning and coordination are proportionate to the actual risk presented.

EIAI therefore recommends that, in finalising the National Strategic Risk Assessment 2026, Government:

1. consider whether public-event and mass-gathering risk is sufficiently visible within the existing strategic-risk framework, including whether more explicit recognition as a cross-cutting risk is warranted;
2. consider greater alignment between the National Strategic Risk Assessment and the Large Crowd Event risk already identified within the State's national emergency-risk assessment;



3. consider whether a more nationally consistent, proportionate and risk-based approach is required for events that fall outside the statutory Outdoor Event Licence process, building on previous Government work relating to events of 5,000 people and under; and
4. ensure that any further consideration of this issue includes engagement with the professional event industry alongside relevant Government Departments, local authorities, Principal Response Agencies and other stakeholders.

The central question for the National Strategic Risk Assessment is:

Can Ireland be confident that every public event presenting a material public-safety or emergency-planning risk becomes visible to the appropriate bodies sufficiently early for the level of planning, specialist input and inter-agency coordination to be proportionate to that risk?

About the Event Industry Association of Ireland

The Event Industry Association of Ireland (EIAI) is the national representative body for Ireland's professional event industry. Its membership comprises more than 850 businesses, organisations and individual professionals, collectively representing over 56,000 people working across the sector.

EIAI's membership includes individual professionals and businesses alongside organisations representing specific parts of the industry, including the Irish Exhibition Organisers Association (IEOA), the Irish Showmen's Guild, Funfairs & Circuses, the Wedding Band Association and the Irish Inflatable Hirers Federation. These organisations retain their own identities and sectoral roles, while EIAI provides a unified voice on national policy, enterprise, governance and cross-industry issues.

Ireland's event industry is a broad and interconnected ecosystem that does not align neatly with conventional sectoral classifications. It encompasses event management and production, festivals, exhibitions, conferences and business events, entertainment, technical production, staging and temporary infrastructure, safety and security, transport, catering, attractions, performers, venues, communications and a substantial network of specialist suppliers and independent professionals. Many businesses operate across several of these areas and multiple event types, reflecting the inherently cross-sector nature of the industry.

This diversity is one of the industry's strengths, but it can also make the sector difficult to identify and represent within traditional policy and regulatory structures. EIAI provides national representation for this complex ecosystem, supports coherent and proportionate event governance, and works to ensure that the operational realities of planning and delivering events are understood in national policy, regulatory and strategic-risk discussions.



1. Introduction

The Event Industry Association of Ireland (EIAI) welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the development of the National Strategic Risk Assessment 2026. The event industry sits at the intersection of many of the risks already identified within the NSRA, including extreme weather, infrastructure resilience, energy security, cybersecurity, public health, social cohesion, terrorism, and disruption to transport and other essential services.

These risks can converge rapidly in live event environments, where substantial numbers of people, temporary infrastructure, public spaces, transport systems and multiple organisations may be involved at the same time. Events may depend on temporary structures, electrical and power systems, communications and public infrastructure; make extensive use of the public realm; and require coordinated action between local authorities, emergency services, State bodies and private-sector operators. In certain circumstances, an incident can generate an immediate requirement for multi-agency emergency response.

The purpose of this submission is not to suggest that public events are inherently unsafe, nor that all events require the same degree of regulatory intervention. EIAI is also not proposing that the National Strategic Risk Assessment should become a detailed event-regulation framework. Rather, the submission draws attention to a potential system-level vulnerability: whether public-event and mass-gathering risks are consistently identified, communicated, assessed and coordinated across the State, particularly where an event falls outside, or does not enter, established statutory planning and multi-agency processes.

This submission forms part of EIAI's wider work on national event governance. Through engagement with Government, the Oireachtas, local authorities and other public bodies, EIAI has consistently advocated proportionate, risk-based and nationally coherent approaches to public-event planning. Its participation in the Joint Oireachtas Committee's 2026 consideration of Developing Ireland's Live Music Industry reflects the broader policy context in which event delivery, infrastructure and governance are increasingly being examined.

The NSRA provides an appropriate opportunity to consider this issue specifically at the level of national strategic risk and preparedness. This is consistent with the purpose of the assessment as a horizon-scanning exercise addressing significant short-, medium- and longer-term risks. It also sits alongside, but is distinct from, the separate National Risk Assessment undertaken through the Government Task Force on Emergency Planning.



2. EIAI's position on the existing strategic risks

EIAI considers that the 24 existing strategic risks identified in the National Strategic Risk Assessment 2024 remain appropriate and does not propose that any be removed. From an event-industry perspective, many of these risks have direct operational relevance.

Extreme weather can affect temporary structures, crowd movement, site conditions, transport arrangements and decisions around cancellation or evacuation. Cybersecurity incidents can disrupt ticketing, accreditation, communications and operational systems, while energy disruption can affect both temporary and permanent event infrastructure. Pandemics can fundamentally alter whether and how mass gatherings can take place, and terrorism and other security threats can require substantial advance planning and coordination between organisers and State bodies.

The [National Risk Assessment 2024](#) assessment recognises that strategic risks are interconnected, may occur concurrently and can amplify one another. This is particularly evident in live event environments, where weather, infrastructure, technology, public health, transport and security risks can converge within a single operational footprint.

EIAI therefore does not regard public-event and mass-gathering risk as separate from the existing strategic-risk framework. The question raised by this submission is whether the concentration and interaction of these risks within event environments is sufficiently visible within that framework, particularly where established planning, information-sharing and coordination mechanisms are not triggered.

3. Public events already feature in Ireland's national risk architecture

Public-event and mass-gathering risk is already recognised within the State's national risk architecture. The [National Risk Assessment for Ireland 2023 — Updated 2026](#), prepared through the Office of Emergency Planning in the Department of Defence, forms part of the State's wider risk-management framework. It states that it complements the Department of the Taoiseach's strategic-risk assessment and focuses on key risks with the potential to trigger a national-level emergency.

Within that assessment, "Large Crowd Event" is identified as one of Ireland's Civil Risks and appears in the National Risk Matrix alongside risks including disruption to critical supply chains, pandemics and terrorist incidents.

The treatment of Large Crowd Event is particularly relevant to this submission. The assessment states that the organisation of large events, with "in excess of 5,000 people expected to attend", is well regulated. It notes that Event Management Plans are prepared and shared with the relevant local authority through the licensing process and that other stakeholders, including the health service and An Garda Síochána, are consulted.

The reasonable worst-case scenario identified by the Expert Focus Group is markedly different. It concerns an unlicensed event, such as a local festival, protest or social-media-driven gathering, organised without consultation with the Principal Response Agencies. The assessment states that an incident at such an event could escalate and that the absence of a comprehensive emergency plan may inhibit the response. It also notes that cross-border intelligence and the sharing of audience profiling can support event-risk assessment and emergency-response planning.



This distinction is significant. The State's own national emergency-risk assessment does not treat crowd size, in isolation, as the determining issue. Instead, its reasonable worst-case scenario combines a crowd event with the absence of structured consultation and comprehensive emergency planning. This supports consideration of whether public-event and mass-gathering risks that fall outside, or do not enter, established planning and coordination arrangements are sufficiently visible within the wider national strategic-risk framework.

This is the central issue EIAI asks the National Strategic Risk Assessment to consider.

4. The 5,000-person threshold and risk identification

Ireland's statutory Outdoor Event Licence regime provides an important and structured planning mechanism for prescribed events. Under the [Planning and Development Regulations 2001 Part 16, Licensing of Outdoor Events](#), an event at which the audience comprises 5,000 or more people is prescribed for the purposes of section 230 of the Planning and Development Act 2000. For this purpose, the Regulations define the audience as those attending the event on a particular day, excluding those working or performing at it. They also require the anticipated audience to be stated in advance and require the application to include a draft Event Management Plan setting out, among other matters, a site emergency plan, traffic-management plan and safety strategy.

This statutory framework is an important part of Ireland's event-governance system. EIAI is not suggesting that it should be displaced, nor that the 5,000-person threshold should simply be reduced. The strategic issue is that attendance, while clearly relevant, is not by itself a complete measure of event risk. The licensing process must also operate prospectively: decisions are necessarily made on the basis of the attendance and event characteristics anticipated before the event takes place.

A relatively modest event may involve significant temporary structures, generators, complex electrical systems, LPG, inflatables, intensive interaction between vehicles and pedestrians, extensive use of the public realm, water-based activity, vulnerable participants or constrained emergency access. Conversely, a substantially larger event may take place within an established venue with permanent infrastructure, known capacities and mature operational arrangements. The level and nature of risk can therefore depend on considerably more than audience size alone.

There is also an inherent distinction between anticipated and actual attendance. The [Regulations](#) require the anticipated audience to be declared as part of the application process. An event genuinely expected to attract fewer than 5,000 people may ultimately attract a considerably larger crowd, meaning that the actual operating environment can differ materially from that on which the initial planning pathway was based.

The strategic question is therefore broader than whether the numerical threshold itself is appropriate. The relevant issue is whether Ireland's overall event-governance system can consistently identify events whose scale, characteristics or risk profile warrant enhanced planning, specialist review or multi-agency engagement, regardless of whether a single attendance threshold is crossed.



5. Events outside the Outdoor Event Licence process

Not every public event that presents significant crowd, infrastructure or public-realm considerations necessarily enters the same statutory pathway. Many events fall below the threshold for an Outdoor Event Licence, while others are managed through different administrative or regulatory processes. These include route-based and sporting events, parades and other public-realm activities whose operational footprint may extend across streets, transport networks and multiple public spaces rather than remaining within a defined venue. There are also circumstances in which an event legitimately forecast to attract a modest attendance ultimately draws a significantly larger crowd than anticipated, altering its risk profile in ways that may not have been captured by the original planning route.

The existence of these varied pathways does not mean that such events are unregulated or that organisers are exempt from legal or safety responsibilities. Depending on the nature and location of the event, different statutory duties, land-use permissions, road-management processes, fire-safety requirements, occupational-safety obligations, venue-specific requirements, policing arrangements and local-authority procedures may apply. These frameworks operate alongside one another and reflect the diversity of event types, settings and delivery structures across the State.

The strategic issue is therefore not the existence of multiple processes, but the consistency with which material risks become visible to the appropriate public bodies and are acted upon in a timely and coordinated manner. Effective risk management depends on whether:

- the event is known to the appropriate public bodies;
- sufficient information is available early enough for its characteristics to be understood;
- material hazards are identified and communicated;
- information reaches the departments, agencies or specialist functions whose involvement is warranted; and
- appropriate planning and emergency arrangements are in place before the event takes place.

Different administrative routes are not inherently problematic. The strategic vulnerability arises where an event capable of generating significant public-safety consequences can move through the overall system without its actual risk profile triggering a level of scrutiny, coordination or multi-agency engagement proportionate to its complexity, scale or potential impact. It is this potential gap in visibility, information flow and coordination that warrants consideration within the National Strategic Risk Assessment.

6. Government has already recognised the need for greater consistency

This issue has already been recognised within Government policy. In 2021, the Night-Time Economy Taskforce recommended a standardised event-planning system across local authorities for events of 5,000 and under, with a view to migrating all applications online.

This recommendation is particularly relevant in the present context because it acknowledged the need for greater national consistency in the planning of events that fall outside the statutory Outdoor Event Licence threshold, and it framed the matter as a national policy concern rather than a purely administrative issue for individual local authorities.



Current emergency-planning material reinforces this. The [HSE's Major Emergency Plans](#) identify a crowd incident at an event involving large numbers of people as a risk. Existing controls include event management and risk assessment, event licensing, event-safety guidance and cooperation between the Principal Response Agencies. Under further mitigation measures, the plans expressly identify a requirement for guidance when dealing with unlicensed events.

Read alongside the National Risk Assessment's reasonable worst-case scenario for a Large Crowd Event, these sources reveal a consistent State-level policy concern: structured planning, risk assessment, information-sharing and multi-agency cooperation are recognised as important controls, while events that fall outside established planning and consultation arrangements remain an area requiring attention.

EIAI considers this directly relevant to the National Strategic Risk Assessment. The issue is not confined to the administration of individual events; it concerns whether the State has sufficiently consistent mechanisms for ensuring that material public-event risks are identified and brought within appropriate planning and coordination structures before an incident occurs.

7. Information and coordination as the strategic vulnerability

From the perspective of the event industry, the central issue is not simply whether an organiser has obtained a particular licence, permit or permission. Effective preparedness depends on the existence of a coherent information and coordination chain through which an event becomes visible to the relevant authorities, its characteristics are understood, and its risks are assessed and addressed in a structured and timely manner.

For this chain to operate effectively, a number of conditions must be met. These include:

- whether the event is known to the appropriate public bodies;
- whether sufficient information is available early enough for its characteristics and potential hazards to be understood;
- whether material hazards are identified and analysed;
- whether information reaches the departments, agencies or specialist functions whose involvement is warranted; and
- whether appropriate planning and emergency arrangements are in place before members of the public are exposed to the risk.

Where these conditions are satisfied, proportionate advance planning can substantially reduce risk and ensure that the relevant authorities, organisers and specialist functions understand their roles should an incident occur. Where an event does not enter an appropriate process, where coordination relies heavily on the organiser already knowing whom to contact, or where information becomes fragmented between organisations or functions, opportunities for advance mitigation can be significantly reduced.

This distinction is particularly important because permission and assurance are not necessarily the same thing. Permission may establish that an event can use land, occupy public space, close a road or undertake a particular activity. Safety assurance asks a different question: whether the material risks associated with that event have been identified, understood and addressed appropriately before the event opens.

EIAI considers that the integrity of this information and coordination chain is the central strategic issue. A serious incident at a public event may simultaneously involve local government, An Garda Síochána, fire and rescue services, ambulance and health services, transport operators, utilities, venue or land operators and private event-management resources. The consequences can therefore extend



considerably beyond the organiser and the event site, reinforcing the need for consistent national mechanisms that ensure material risks are visible and appropriately managed before an incident occurs.

8. A proportionate, risk-based approach

EIAI is not proposing that every public gathering should be subjected to the statutory Outdoor Event Licence process or to administrative requirements designed for major festivals and concerts. Such an approach could create unnecessary bureaucracy for community, cultural, sporting and other straightforward activities without delivering a corresponding public-safety benefit. However, the reverse is equally important: attendance alone does not define the complete risk profile of an event, and reliance on a single numerical threshold cannot, by itself, ensure that material risks are consistently identified.

A proportionate system should allow straightforward, low-risk activity to proceed efficiently while also identifying events whose characteristics warrant additional planning, specialist input or multi-agency coordination.

Depending on the nature of the event, relevant factors may include:

- anticipated attendance and the degree of uncertainty attached to that forecast;
- event duration, location and site characteristics;
- crowd profile, density and movement;
- use of roads, transport infrastructure and public space;
- temporary structures and installations;
- temporary electrical systems and power generation;
- fire and gas risks;
- transport dependency and access arrangements;
- medical, welfare and accessibility requirements;
- exposure to adverse weather;
- security and public-order considerations;
- emergency access, evacuation and dispersal arrangements; and
- the complexity, competence and capacity of the delivery structure.

The detailed design of any such process is a matter for the relevant Departments, local authorities, agencies and stakeholders. At the level of the National Strategic Risk Assessment, the more fundamental question is whether Ireland has sufficient national visibility over this class of risk, together with sufficiently coherent mechanisms to ensure that the level of planning and coordination is proportionate to the actual risk presented, rather than being determined primarily by a numerical attendance threshold or by the particular administrative route through which an event enters the system.

9. Sporting events and use of the public realm

Sporting events operate within a range of statutory and administrative arrangements, including venue requirements, safety provisions, roads legislation and local-authority processes. The issue is therefore not whether sporting activity should be brought within the Outdoor Event Licence system, nor does EIAI suggest that sporting events are unregulated. The relevant question is whether the combination of existing frameworks consistently results in a level of advance risk assessment, information-sharing and coordination proportionate to the actual characteristics of the event.



This is particularly significant where sporting events make extensive use of the public realm. Road races and marathons, for example, may involve substantial numbers of participants and spectators, major road closures and traffic diversions, disruption to public transport, temporary infrastructure, complex crowd movements, emergency-access requirements and significant medical provision. In such circumstances, the risk profile extends beyond the sporting activity itself and can involve many of the same public-safety, infrastructure and coordination considerations encountered at other large public events.

Dublin City Council's current application process illustrates this point. Running events and races between 5 km and 42.2 km that involve infrastructure are subject to a specific public-domain application and Event Management Plan process, with organisers directed to relevant emergency-management and event-safety guidance. [Dublin City Council](#)

This demonstrates that significant planning and coordination requirements can arise outside the conventional large concert or festival model. It also illustrates why event classification alone may not provide a complete indication of the level of public-safety planning required. Comparable risks can arise across different event types, while the administrative category into which an event falls may not fully reflect the complexity of its operational footprint or the level of coordination required.

For the purposes of the National Strategic Risk Assessment, EIAI considers the strategic issue to be whether events presenting comparable levels of crowd, infrastructure, transport or emergency-planning risk receive proportionate consideration regardless of their classification, while recognising the legitimate differences between sporting, cultural, entertainment, community and other event types. The underlying question is one of national visibility and system-level coherence: whether planning and coordination are driven by the actual risk presented rather than primarily by the administrative route through which an event enters the system.

10. Relationship with the National Strategic Risk Assessment

The 2026 consultation asks stakeholders both whether the existing strategic risks remain appropriate and whether additional significant risks should be considered under the geopolitical, economic, societal, environmental or technological categories. As set out above, EIAI considers that the existing 24 risks remain relevant.

EIAI is not seeking to prescribe how the Department should categorise the additional issue raised in this submission. Public-event and mass-gathering risk is inherently cross-cutting. It may have societal dimensions, but can also involve infrastructure, extreme weather, public health, transport, cybersecurity, energy, terrorism, public order and economic consequences. It therefore does not sit neatly within a single thematic category and instead interacts with several domains already recognised within the strategic-risk framework.

EIAI asks that the development of the National Strategic Risk Assessment 2026 consider whether risks associated with public events and mass gatherings, particularly where events fall outside, or do not enter, established statutory and multi-agency planning arrangements, are adequately captured within the existing framework, or whether more explicit recognition as a cross-cutting strategic risk is warranted.

Consideration should also be given to the relationship between the National Strategic Risk Assessment and the Large Crowd Event risk already identified within the State's national emergency-risk assessment. The latter expressly states that the Department of the Taoiseach's strategic assessment provides context and a foundation for the emergency-planning risk assessment.

There is therefore a clear basis for considering whether greater alignment and visibility are needed between the two processes in relation to public events. This is particularly relevant given the potential for incidents



at public gatherings to involve multiple agencies, affect transport and other infrastructure, and generate consequences extending beyond the immediate event site or route.

Greater visibility of this cross-cutting risk within the strategic assessment could support a more coherent national understanding of where public-event risk sits within the State's wider preparedness framework, while leaving the detailed management of individual events to the appropriate Departments, agencies, local authorities and statutory processes.

11. The role of the event industry and the importance of continued engagement

Effective public-event risk management depends on cooperation between Government Departments, local authorities, the Principal Response Agencies, transport bodies, land and venue operators, event organisers, event-safety professionals, production personnel, contractors and specialist suppliers. The event industry therefore has an important role not only in planning and managing events, but also in helping Government understand how national policy, regulatory frameworks and emergency-management systems operate when they converge in a live event environment.

EIAI's wider national-governance work has consistently sought to support this connection by promoting greater clarity, consistency and professional capability, while recognising the importance of appropriate local decision-making. Effective event governance depends on clear communication between the public bodies responsible for regulation, infrastructure and emergency preparedness and the private organisations responsible for planning and delivering events. The interaction between these systems is central to ensuring that material risks are identified, understood and addressed in a proportionate and timely manner.

EIAI would welcome continued engagement with Government on the issues raised through this consultation and would be willing to contribute industry knowledge to any subsequent consideration of public-event and mass-gathering risk. This could include work relating to event governance, emergency preparedness, risk identification, information-sharing and the interaction between national and local systems. The industry's operational experience can provide valuable insight into how planning, regulatory and emergency-management arrangements function in practice, including where greater consistency, clarity or coordination may strengthen national preparedness.

The objective should remain proportionate and practical: to support the continued delivery of safe and successful events while ensuring that events presenting material risks become visible early enough for those risks to be appropriately assessed, communicated and managed. A coherent national approach, informed by both public-sector responsibilities and industry expertise, can help ensure that Ireland's event-governance system remains capable of responding to emerging risks while continuing to facilitate the cultural, sporting, entertainment, community and commercial events that contribute to Ireland's social and economic life.



11. Recommendations

EIAI recommends that, in finalising the National Strategic Risk Assessment 2026, Government:

1. Consider whether public-event and mass-gathering risk is sufficiently visible within the existing strategic-risk framework, including whether more explicit recognition as a cross-cutting risk is warranted.
2. Consider greater alignment between the National Strategic Risk Assessment and the Large Crowd Event risk already identified within the State's national emergency-risk assessment.
3. Consider whether a more nationally consistent, proportionate and risk-based approach is required for events that fall outside the statutory Outdoor Event Licence process, building on previous Government work relating to events of 5,000 people and under.
4. Ensure that any further consideration of this issue includes engagement with the professional event industry alongside relevant Government Departments, local authorities, Principal Response Agencies and other stakeholders.

12. Conclusion

Ireland has an established statutory framework for prescribed large outdoor events, extensive emergency-management structures and significant expertise across Government, local authorities, emergency services and the professional event industry. However, a recurring issue is evident across the State's own policy and risk material.

As outlined in this submission, Government recommended the development of a standardised local-authority event-planning system for events of 5,000 people and under in 2021. HSE emergency-planning material subsequently identified the need for guidance when dealing with unlicensed events. Most significantly, the National Risk Assessment for Ireland 2023 - Updated 2026 identifies Large Crowd Event as a national-level Civil Risk and uses, as its reasonable worst-case scenario, an unlicensed gathering taking place without consultation with the Principal Response Agencies and without a comprehensive emergency plan.

These findings are closely related. Taken together, they suggest that the strategic issue is not simply the size of an event, nor whether a particular licence or administrative process applies. The more fundamental question is whether material event risks reliably become visible within the State's planning and preparedness systems early enough for those risks to be understood, communicated and managed before an incident occurs.

EIAI therefore asks Government to consider the following question in finalising the National Strategic Risk Assessment 2026:

Can Ireland be confident that every public event presenting a material public-safety or emergency-planning risk becomes visible to the appropriate bodies sufficiently early for the level of planning, specialist input and inter-agency coordination to be proportionate to that risk?

This question sits naturally within EIAI's wider work on national event governance, but is distinct from detailed discussions concerning licensing, permitting or individual local-authority procedures. It concerns



the capacity of the State's wider risk architecture to identify and prepare for a recognised class of public-safety risk, including where an event does not enter the established planning or consultation pathway normally associated with prescribed large outdoor events.

Consideration of this issue through the NSRA would complement, rather than duplicate, the detailed responsibilities of individual Departments and agencies and the separate National Risk Assessment undertaken through the Government Task Force on Emergency Planning. It would also provide an opportunity to strengthen the connection between strategic-risk identification and the operational systems through which public-event risks are identified and managed.

EIAI would welcome the opportunity to contribute practical industry expertise to any further consideration of this issue, particularly in relation to how regulatory, operational and emergency-management systems interact in live event environments. The industry's experience of planning and delivering events can provide valuable insight into how these systems operate in practice and where greater consistency, visibility or coordination may strengthen national preparedness.

Incorporating that perspective would support a more coherent national approach to public-event and mass-gathering risk, helping to ensure that material risks are identified early and brought within appropriate planning and coordination structures in a timely, proportionate and consistent manner.

