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Public-Event Risk

Why Public-Event Risk Needs to Be Visible in Ireland’s National Risk Framework

The Event Industry Association of Ireland has submitted its response to the Government’s consultation on the National Strategic Risk Assessment 2026, raising a question that goes beyond event licensing or attendance thresholds: can Ireland be confident that public events presenting material safety or emergency-planning risks become visible to the appropriate bodies early enough for those risks to be properly assessed and coordinated?

The submission does not propose removing or replacing any of the 24 strategic risks already identified by Government. Many of those risks are directly relevant to events, including extreme weather, infrastructure resilience, energy security, cybersecurity, public health, terrorism, transport disruption and social cohesion. Events can bring several of these risks together in one operational environment, often involving temporary infrastructure, public spaces, transport systems and multiple public and private organisations.  The issue EIAI is asking Government to consider is whether public-event and mass-gathering risk is sufficiently visible within that wider framework, particularly where an event falls outside, or does not enter, established statutory planning and multi-agency processes.

This is not simply about the 5,000-person threshold

Ireland has an established statutory Outdoor Event Licence process for prescribed events involving audiences of 5,000 or more. That system provides an important structure for event-management planning, emergency arrangements, traffic planning and consultation. EIAI is not proposing that this framework should be replaced, nor that the 5,000-person threshold should simply be lowered. Attendance is important, but it does not by itself describe the complete risk profile of an event. A smaller event can involve temporary structures, generators, electrical installations, LPG, inflatables, significant interaction between vehicles and pedestrians, extensive use of public space or difficult emergency access. A considerably larger event may take place within an established venue with permanent infrastructure, known capacities and mature operating arrangements.

There is also an important distinction between anticipated and actual attendance. Event-planning decisions are necessarily made in advance. An event genuinely expected to attract fewer than 5,000 people may ultimately attract considerably more, changing the operational environment from the one on which the original planning pathway was based. The broader question, therefore, is whether the system can identify events whose actual characteristics warrant additional planning or specialist involvement, regardless of whether a single attendance threshold is crossed.

Government already recognises large crowd events as a national risk

This is not a new risk category being created by the event industry. The National Risk Assessment for Ireland 2023 – Updated 2026, produced through the Office of Emergency Planning, already identifies “Large Crowd Event” as one of Ireland’s Civil Risks. Importantly, its reasonable worst-case scenario is not simply a major licensed concert or festival. It considers an unlicensed event, such as a local festival, protest or social-media-driven gathering, organised without consultation with the Principal Response Agencies. The assessment notes that an incident could escalate and that the absence of a comprehensive emergency plan could inhibit the response. That distinction matters.

The risk identified by the State is not simply “a lot of people in one place”. The availability of structured planning, information-sharing and multi-agency coordination is itself part of the risk picture. Other Government policy points in the same direction. In 2021, the Night-Time Economy Taskforce recommended a standardised event-planning system across local authorities for events of 5,000 people and under. HSE emergency-planning material also identifies crowd incidents involving large numbers of people as a risk and specifically identifies the need for guidance when dealing with unlicensed events. Taken together, these are not isolated observations. They point to a recurring question about how events outside established planning and consultation arrangements become visible within the system.

Different routes are not the problem

Public events are diverse and should not all be processed in exactly the same way. Some events fall below the Outdoor Event Licence threshold. Others are managed through different statutory or administrative routes. Sporting and route-based events, parades and other activities taking place in the public realm may interact with roads, transport systems and multiple public spaces rather than being contained within a conventional event site.

That does not mean these events are unregulated. Depending on the circumstances, organisers may have to deal with land-use permissions, roads legislation, fire-safety requirements, occupational-safety obligations, venue requirements, policing arrangements and local-authority procedures. The existence of different routes is entirely reasonable. The vulnerability arises if an event capable of creating significant public-safety consequences can move through those different systems without its actual risk profile triggering a proportionate level of scrutiny, specialist input or multi-agency coordination.

For EIAI, this is fundamentally an information and coordination issue. An event has to become visible to the appropriate bodies. Sufficient information has to be available early enough for its characteristics to be understood. Material hazards have to be identified. Information must reach the departments, agencies or specialists whose involvement is warranted, and appropriate planning and emergency arrangements must be in place before the event takes place. Permission to hold or facilitate an event is important, but permission and safety assurance are not necessarily the same function.

A risk-based approach, not more regulation for its own sake

EIAI’s submission argues for proportionality – straightforward, low-risk community, cultural, sporting and commercial activity should be able to proceed efficiently. The objective should not be to impose major-event requirements on every public gathering. Equally, attendance alone should not determine the level of planning required.

Factors such as crowd profile and movement, location, temporary infrastructure, transport impacts, emergency access, medical provision, adverse-weather exposure, security considerations and the complexity of the delivery arrangements can all affect the level of risk presented by an event. The principle is straightforward: the level of planning and coordination should follow the actual risk.

What EIAI has asked Government to consider

In its submission, EIAI has made four recommendations. It asks Government to consider whether public-event and mass-gathering risk is sufficiently visible within the existing strategic-risk framework; whether there should be greater alignment between the National Strategic Risk Assessment and the Large Crowd Event risk already identified through the national emergency-risk assessment; whether a more nationally consistent and proportionate approach is required for events outside the statutory Outdoor Event Licence process; and whether the professional event industry should be included in any further work arising from this issue. EIAI_NationalStrategicRiskAsses…

These recommendations do not prescribe a new licensing system. They ask Government to examine whether Ireland’s national risk architecture provides sufficient visibility and coordination across the different systems through which events are planned and delivered.

The question at the centre of EIAI’s submission is ultimately a simple one:

Can Ireland be confident that every public event presenting a material public-safety or emergency-planning risk becomes visible to the appropriate bodies sufficiently early for the level of planning, specialist input and inter-agency coordination to be proportionate to that risk?

For an industry that operates across local government, emergency planning, transport, infrastructure, public safety and the public realm, that is not simply an event-industry question. It is a question about how effectively Ireland identifies and prepares for risk.

Click here to read our full submission: EIAI_NationalStrategicRiskAssessment2026_Submission

Make a Submission

Click here to find out more and make a further submission: https://www.gov.ie/en/department-of-the-taoiseach/consultations/national-strategic-risk-assessment-public-consultation-2026/

Elaine O'Connor

http://ie.linkedin.com/in/elaineoconnor